A Critical Analysis Of Britain’s Response And Effectiveness To Piracy Off The Somalia Coast
The research project was a critical analysis of Britain’s response and effectiveness to piracy off the Somalia Coast. The specific objectives of this study were to establish the United Kingdom’s (UK’s) influence to international counter piracy responses for Somalia; and identify specific UK’s responses to piracy in Somalia. Statement of the problem was about the UK’s coersive strategy such as pre-emptive naval and airstrikes against suspected piracy target, which only serves to radicalise the piracy group inquestion and create collateral damage, which alienates the local population, leading to more support to the acts of pirates by the local population and extents the membership of the group through voluntary enrolment. Lethal force as the first option could exacerbate violence and endanger the lives of hostages. Moreso, pirate gangs do not have permanent land bases and could quickly reorganize and deploy from other locations. Britain has focused on piracy perpetrators, rather than piracy enablers. An array of counter-piracy and deterrence measures; from violent armed attacks on suspected pirate skiffs and mother ships, to arrests, trials and imprisonment of suspects in Kenya and other non Somali jurisdictions-have proved less effective than hoped. The theoretical framework under this study is realist perspective that is linked to the states which are seen as anarchical and viewed as the unitary actors. Through this theory, the international community combine efforts in dealing with piracy.Under methodology, both descriptive and explorative research designs were used, data collection was through focus group discussions, key informant interview and open ended questionnaires. The UK influenced the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution (1816), it co-sponsored this resolution addressing the problem of piracy off the Somalia Coast. The resolution permitted the states co-operating with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to enter the Somalia’s waters and use all means available in repressing piracy and armed sea robbery. It also influenced the deployment of the three international naval forces to operate in Somalia. These are North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), European Union and the United States, this is along the counter piracy, counter terrorism and counter narcotics task forces; and maritime security. The Royal navy regularly contributes to these operations and also provides the Operational Commander; and the Operational head quarters for (NATO) at Northwood. The Royal Navy has an disclosed number of vessels within the Gulf region. The UK also influenced the Combined Task Force ICTF) 151, whose purpose is to conduct counter piracy operations across the Combined Maritime Forces’ (CMF) area of responsibility. Recommendations include; a more attractive course of action would be for Britain to assemble an effective regional coalition with good negotiation and mediation skills, which is willing to deal with Somali sub-state entities in order to reach a more immediate solution even though this might mean deferring agreement on a unitary state to a later date. Finance an effective and wellmotivated Puntland Police service is another recommendation; the current investment in coast guard is the prefered defence against piracy in a mature and well-structured state. British and other international Development agencies working on alternative livelihood programmes aimed at young men need to be better co-ordinated and better target communities where pirate recruits are known to be drawn from. Present work is largely based on where it has been possible to deliver programmes rather than being responsive to analysis of where pirate recruits emanate from.