| dc.description.abstract | Using the Realist approach to the study of international politics, this discourse attempts to explain the root cause of conflict in African regional organisations. It proceed from the theoretical proposition that conflict is the most salient aspect of an interaction between two states whose power- is asymmetrical to analyse political conflict in the PTA. In the PTA, this conflict manifests itself in the controversy over the application of the local equity rule of the Treaty. In this conflict, there are two warring constituencies. And the bone of contention between them is whether or not the foreign firms operating in the PTA region should be allowed to enjoy preferential treatment in the PTA. Kenya on the one hand stands opposed to the application of this rule because .it restricts foreign firms from participating in intra-PTA trade. On the other hand , Uganda Tanzania , Somalia. and Ethiopia argue ·that its application is a sine qua non if intra-PTA trade is to benefit member states equally. The task of this study has been to investigate the actual factors accounting for this conflict. We have further argued that the political conflict is a struggle for certain power positions in intra-PTA's reward structure and that the positions occupied by a given PTA member country determined by the power at its disposal is largely Using three elements of power, we have attempted at a power measurement of the warring PTA states in intra-PTA trade.
This study shows that Kenya occupies a position of preponderance in intra-PTA trade while the contending constituency occupies a rather insignificant position in the same. The asymmetry in power between the warring constituencies according to this study is a source of political conflict. We have argued that political conflict over the application of the local equity rule is also a function of different patterns of foreign investments among the warring parties. For instance, for every three foreign firms operating in Kenya, there is only one in Ethiopia and none in Somalia. Hence, those states whose levels of foreign investments aie low would want the local rule to apply to PTA trade while the reverse is true for those whose level of foreign investments are high. Given that for the most part states are motivated by their national interests, these confIicting positions breed conflict.
Due to the importance of the local equity rule to the operations of the PTA, we have offered a few possible solutions to the resolve of the conflict sorrouding it. Emphasis on our policy prescription however favours no side to the conflict. Our observation is that the resolution of this conflict must offer a point of concurrence between the national interests of the parties in conflict. | en |
