| dc.description.abstract | Statistical indications on entrepreneurial practices that violate individual and social good
(Curver, 2004; Velasquez, 2002) are astounding both in terms of the prevalence and
brazenness. In a number of studies (Hisrich, 2004; Drucker, 1985; Carr, 1968)
entrepreneurial practice and violations have been conceived as though they were the same
irrespective of social and cultural circumstances. This study set out to derive and
systematically present the virtues of entrepreneurship in specific traditions. Secondly, to
subject the normative ethics of entrepreneurial practice to philosophical analysis with the
aim of detrmining their status vis-a-vis social good. And thirdly, to derive models of
entrepreneurial ethics from the discourse of each tradition. Two hypotheses were used in
this study:
1) The pnmary virtues of entrepreneurial practice are determined by the social
tradition in which they are deployed.
2) The primary virtues of entrepreneurs are in conflict with social good.
This thesis uses the heuristic resources of the concept tradition and the auxiliary concepts
of practice and narrative in analyzing narratives and biographical accounts of
entrepreneurial practice in the liberal, the libertarian, and the communitarian traditions.
The analysis of the narratives and biographical accounts for each tradition IS a
prolegomena to the presentation of a model of ethical entrepreneurial practice.
The following conclusions were the outcome of the study. The practice of
entrepreneurship in the liberal tradition is adversely impacted by the plurality of visions,
and lack of consensus on the good. Entrepreneurial violation of social good in this
tradition is neither accidental nor incidental, but rather intrinsic. The confusion
engendered by the plurality of visions, coupled with an atomistic persona lead to a
fragmented mode of existence that is mirrored in the use of rationality and its auxiliary
virtues in destructive entrepreneurial practices. The libertarian tradition prescribes the
priority of rational self-interest, the liberty of the moral agent, and the conviction that the
market has an inherent mechanism of fostering rationality, industry, honesty, and greed,
and harmonizing these with social good. The preeminence of rationality and greed as
virtues of entrepreneurial practice is unique. to this tradition. Moreover, the use of these
virtues results in a tendency towards impartiality, and agent-neutrality, which eventuate
in the violation of social good. In the case of the communitarian tradition, categories of
stakeholders such as workers, customers, and consumers could be unified or inapplicable
to entrepreneurial practice in the communitarian tradition. This tradition prescribes
communal good asthe primary good of the entrepreneur and devotion as the primary,
critical virtue in entrepreneurial practice. Rationality, honesty, and justice are deployed in
concord with communal good, which is in tandem with individual good. Nevertheless,
violations of social good arise from the fact that communal good is not equivalent to
social good.
On the overall, the practice of entrepreneurship in all the three traditions are informed by
the three principles, namely the Principle of Sufficiency, the Principle of Rational
Relevance and the Principle of Appropriate Motivation. Although these are not moral
principles, they reflect the constraints that tradition imposes in the practice of
entrepreneurship. There is need for systematic, empirical studies of entrepreneurial
practice to test our conclusions. Further, there is need for curricula approaches that take
cognizance of the appropriate moral elements and not simply the technical virtues. | |
