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dc.contributor.authorWainaina, Paul K
dc.date.accessioned2013-05-16T14:21:59Z
dc.date.available2013-05-16T14:21:59Z
dc.date.issued1981-02
dc.identifier.citationMasters of Arts , University of Nairobi (1981)en
dc.identifier.urihttp://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke:8080/xmlui/handle/123456789/23664
dc.description.abstractEven beyond the intellectual level, the idea and feeling of freedom is inherent in the life of normal human beings. Man feels that he is in command of his choices and their realizations. But although the same person feels and is able to talk about free choices, more often than not, the content and limits of these choices are too vague almost to a point of being incomprehensible, hence the need of a clarification. But a clarification of the term free will or freedom of choice cannot be done sufficiently without at the same time considering the doctrine of determinism. Accepting the premise that human beings are the result of their biological and environmental influences, we could still intelligently claim that they have (human beings) freedom of choice or as it were psychological freedom. Freedom of choice should not be construed to mean that 'free choices' are those actions that have no reasons as causes behind them (uncaused events). Thus, while free actions and unfree actions have to be seen within the general 1mv of causation, still free actions are felt to be emanating within man's bio-psychical structure. And that man is aware of these free actions as his actions. It is then within this freedom of choice that we tend to capture the concept of moral responsibility. The concept of moral responsibility in man forms our basis for judging human actions either as morally right or morally wrong. Consequently, morally right actions are praised while morally wrong actions are blamed. Praises are supposed to encourage morally right actions while blames are supposed to deter morally wrong actions. But in the process of judging human actions the society is faced with two basic problems. First, the distinction between free actions (where man was aware of actions as his deliberations) and unfree actions is not always clear-cut. Second, even when it is known that the actions were free in the way defined, it would still be difficult to identify what type of blame is the most effective as a means of behaviour modification for the man whose actions we have disapproved. Thus, faced with the above uncertainities, punishment as a form of blame could only be justified if and only if it is the best means of behaviour modification in a particular occasion. On the same vein the aim of moral education in schools has to do with the enhancement of freedom of choice that is subsumed under the students' biological and environmental determinants. Equally important, moral education has to provide some form and socio-ethical directions to the students. These objectives could be accomplished, I hope, through understanding and discipline of the teachers and the students respectively.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherUniversity of Nairobi.en
dc.titleEducational Implications Of The Metaphysical Controversy Betheen Free Will And Deterninism: With Special Reference To Punishment Moral Education In Schoolsen
dc.typeThesisen
local.publisherDepartment of Arts (philosophy)en


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