| dc.description.abstract | The Belgian Congo crisis of 1960 stemmed from a lack of preparedness on the part of both the Belgians and Congolese leaders in a transition toward national self-determination. The demand for independence came suddenly and in a more radical form than the Belgians had anticipated. Officials capitulated before they could arrange for the transfer of power from the Europeans to the Africans, ihus all parties were unable to handle the post-independence crisis. The Belgians wished to play a"big brother" role, while Congolese leaders wanted to be masters in their own house.
The Afro-Asian states feared the possibility of Soviet- American confrontation in the troubled Congo. Their leaders therefore
believed that the United Nations, if charged with keeping the peace, could diffuse the situation. They also thought the organization
would assist the Congolese government in resolving its problems. They may have expected too much.
The United Nations was inexperienced in peace-keeping. It ' had not faced a situation in which it had to confront armed forces as it sought to defend a weak state's territorial integrity. It had no \
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precedent, and its success or failure also depended on the willingness of its members to contribute troops and funds.
Many states refused to support the operation, and the UN thus became dependent on the United States not only for finances, but also for logistical support. The operation, therefore, could only succeed if it received the unqualified support of the United States.
But this was not always the case. The United States had rejected
the request of the Congolese government for American troop intervention. It favored a UN peace-keeping operation, but it did not want UN units to confront Belgian armed forces in the area. Ties through its NATO alliance largely determined that policy decision.
* Dlicymakers revealed a simplistic attitude. They saw the conflict as between Africans and whites with Communists behind the former. The Eisenhower administration thus sought to protect European interests, to save Europeans from humiliation, and to block Communist designs.
It insisted that an unprepared UN solve the problems. A successful UN operation, however, would have given power to the radical Lumumbists; hence the United States actually frustrated UN efforts to reestablish order and became involved in plots to assassinate Lumumba.
The Kennedy administration fared no better. Its strong anticommunist
position led it to insist on the exclusion of any Soviet influence
in the Congo and on the creation of a unified Congo. Yet factionalism within the administration and opposition in Congress led to continued ambivalence and caution. They thus failed to develop a
single comprehensive policy. They mistakenly blamed communism for the Congo’s problems.
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Conditions in the Congo were not the result of Soviet intrigues. Had the Belgians not manipulated Tshombe to secede, had
the Americans not worked to create a rift between Lumumba, on the one hand, and Kasavubu and Mobutu, on the other, the history of the Congo during the period under study would have been different. United Nations and United States officials never did understand the internal factions which had developed over regionalism and unitarism. The Americans also ignored national sentiment when they plotted to assassinate Lumumba, the only Congolese leader who had broad national support.
The passing of Lumumba left a leadership vacuum which created problems for American policymakers that have not been resolved to date. Even after Mobutu and the army assumed political power in November of 1965, the Congo only achieved a semblance of political stability while the economic situation has deteriorated.
This study covers only the period from July, 1960 to January, 1962. But it is unique on several planes. First, it appears to be the first work by a historian devoted to the examination of United States Congo policies. Second, its reliance on hundreds of the recently
declassified State and Defense and CIA documents, separates it from Professor Stephen Weissman’s study. But most of its findings confirm Weissman's conclusions drawn largely from newspapers and interviews with policymakers and others who were participants in the events. Finally, the study shows clearly that the UN and the United
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states plotted to have Lumumba overthrown and the Soviet Union’s charges against Hammarskjold cannot be simply dismissed as propaganda. | |
