| dc.description.abstract | This study examines the dynamics that led to the exit of the United Nation (UN) mission in Burundi. The study revolves around the theoretical framework put forth by idealists that world security can be ensured collectively through the coming together of states under the UN. The study is guided by two objectives that examine; the internal dynamics within Burundi that caused the termination and the UN mission processes that contributed to the termination. The study found out that the ONUB exit was a function of a convergence of internal political dynamics within Burundi and a rationalized calculation of UN bureaucratic process visa vis national interest which saw value in exit than in likely costs in extended stay.
The study notes that the dividing line between entry and exit in a UN mission is very thin and both need be factored in at the beginning of the mission if total value is to be gained from the mission. Though the UN is emphatic on clear, credible and achievable mandates, there is little emphasis on exit through which assessment of mission success and achievement can be measured.
In this study it is recommends that for the UN to have a strategy for exit from missions, exit should be planned in advance rehearsed during the mission processes and executed when time comes to exit. Secondly, when a transition comes to an end, it may be prudent to consider replacing the entire echelon of top UN mission management and additionally, since the dividing line between deployment and exit is thin, there is need to continuously build channels with other actors directly and opportunistically which could be used to ensure a smooth exit that leaves no gaps that facilitate the resurgence of conflict. | en_US |
