| dc.description.abstract | There is normally a cause for celebration when parties to a protracted conflict enter into
negotiations. When the adversaries complete the negotiations and append their signatures to a
peace agreement, there is even more euphoria. As much as a successful negotiation process is
vital, it is the implementation of the agreements that really determines whether the conflict will
discontinue or not. While a peace agreement that is fully implemented will ascertain lasting
peace, one that is not fully implemented will most likely lead the parties in conflict back to war.
Recognising the nexus between the implementation of peace agreements and the stoppage of
civil wars, this study sets out to explore the essential underlying conditions that will guarantee
implementation success.
To achieve this, the study begins by examining the pre-negotiation process (to determine
how and why parties decide to enter into agreements), the negotiation process (to determine why
parties agree to continue to negotiate until they reach an agreement), and the implementation
process (to establish how the parties behave after a peace agreement has been signed and why).
When these three processes have been scrutinised in their proper contexts, elements that can be
used to explain implementation behaviour will be picked out. This study examines the peace
agreements of Mozambique and Angola to determine the factor(s) that led to successful
implementation in Mozambique and failure i~· Angola. This is done- in the light of William
Zartman's theory of ripe moments.
The methodology of this study is case study-based where comparisons of phenomena in
one country are done relative to the other. The cross-case comparisons were achieved by a
mixture of field research and analysis of secondary data. To collect primary data, visits to the
case study countries were done and interviews carried out with a number of relevant respondents.
The data gathered was then subjected to an intense content analysis. The resulting data was also
analysed with regards to available recorded books and journals.
This study argues that when a peace agreement is negotiated at a ripe moment, it will be
fully implemented. This means that the decision-making environment before negotiations begin
determines whether the signed agreements will be adhered to or not. However, the study's
findings established that concentrating on the pre-negotiation decision-making environment
alone may not sufficiently explain implementation failure or success. In this regard, an expansion
of the theory of ripeness was done when it became apparent that the conditions that make the
parties to a conflict to enter into negotiations can change after some time. When this happens, the
parties to the conflict may essentially forget the pain that had initially pushed them to negotiate.
If this happens, something else needs to come in to fill the vacuum. The study found out that the
factor of a mutually enticing opportunity came into play in the negotiation and implementation
phase in Mozambique. Taking over from the concept of a mutually hurting stalemate (that is
more effective at the pre-negotiation stage); the mutually enticing opportunity was able to keep
the parties to the conflict on the course of peace when the effects of the pain had waned. For
Angola, in addition to the fact that the negotiations took place at moments that were not ripe, the
mutually enticing opportunity factor was conspicuously missing. This was the reason for
implementation failure. As a result, the study concluded that a combination of a mutually hurting
stalemate and a mutually enticing opportunity can best explain implementation success or
failure. | en |
