Conflict modelling and resolution in a dynamic state
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Date
2011-07Author
Omwenga, Vincent Oteke
Type
ThesisLanguage
enMetadata
Show full item recordAbstract
A conflict is neither good (functional) nor bad (dysfunctional). The distinction
depends on the type of conflict, 0 e's attitude and reaction to it thereby making it
constructive or destructive. The absence a clear measuring strategy or framework,
against which it can be evaluated, makes it even harder to differentiate between
good and bad conflict. It is however accepted that if the result of a conflict is
positive, then the conflict is considered "good" and if the result is negative, then
the conflict is "bad".
The formal models and quantitative analysis to explain how strategic actor's
behaviour in a conflict setting are rare even-though model-based approaches are
becoming more commonly used by statisticians and other scientists. These
approaches to a great extent rely on fundamental or empirical models that are
frequently described by systems of differential equations.
The underlying objective of this research was to develop conflict modelling and
resolution models applicable to a dynamic state using ordinary differential
equations (ODE) with integrated logistic model. Solutions to the ODEs were
obtained by the application of Laplace transformation.
This research assumes that a conflict can be described by two main variables;
control variables and state variables which reflect on the structural causes of a
conflict. It is further assumed that a conflict can be described by a Bemoulli
distribution with parameter Yi and that conflicts exist over a span of time with
interplaying variables that can be dynamically modelled and the initial orboundary conditions can be estimated in a dynamic state. In developing the
models, the Game theory and Bayesian theorem are used as the underlying
theoretical concepts. The Game theory and Bayesian theorem are used with the
assumption that conflicts can be described using statistical distributions.
This research shows that modelling of a conflict requires accurate estimation of
control variables (initial conditions) defined by a Bayesian probability distribution
and the variables are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d). The
developed model uses Baye's rule of probability distribution and the Game
theory. In a dynamic state; the initial conditions are estimated as posteriori
conditions by the model.
Using the developed model for the estimation of initial conditions, a logistic
conflict prediction model that gives the trend a conflict is likely to take at time tf
has been developed. The model is derived from the solution of an exponential
growth model and it integrates the initial conditions estimation model as one the
parameters.
A statistical model for conflict resolution using the concept of Bargaining Game
Theory has also been developed. The model assumes that in a conflict there are
two parties with opposing opinions where one makes an offer with a probability
of acceptance or rejection. The Ultimatum Game Theory has been used to
introduce constraints on the offers made by the parties, consequently increasing
the minimum threshold on the demands associated with any offers. It provides an
in-built mechanism through which a conflict resolution model guides anegotiation by ensunng that any offer made IS constrained with a higher
likelihood of acceptance. The model compels the parties involved in a conflict to
establish the demands from the other party and integrating them in any offer
proposed hence boosting the chances of resolving a conflict.
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Sponsorhip
University of NairobiPublisher
School of mathematics